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“I assume you’re here about a hysterectomy . . . ”
Those were the first words my gynecologist ever spoke to me.
Before she sat down, before she said hello, she looked at my chart
and assumed I was in her office for a major surgery that would end
my ability to carry a child at age twenty-seven. After months of
delay, I had scheduled the appointment to address the severe
pelvic pain that I had been dealing with for months. The dread of
that feeling of walking into a gynecologist’s office and facing the
inquisitive looks had caused me to ignore the near-constant pain.
“What is he doing here?” “Is that really a woman?” “What a freak.”
The whispers. The stares. The internalized self-hate.
“Umm . . . no. I am not here for a hysterectomy,” I replied. An
inauspicious beginning for an already fraught relationship—and
this was the “trans-friendly” gynecologist recommended by the
LGBT health center.
My medical records clearly indicated to my gynecologist that I
was transgender (some identifying medical procedures and
medical interventions), and her assumption was that I therefore
wanted a hysterectomy. That might have been a completely fair
assumption from a medical perspective—that a trans man coming
in for a visit with a gynecologist would ask about a hysterectomy.
The problem is not that she asked; it was that without knowing
anything about me she assumed that the only possible reason for
my visit was to remove my reproductive organs. This type of
engagement with a trans patient sends at least two concerning
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messages: the first is that trans people do not need access to
preventive care and only visit the doctor when discussing health
care related to transition; and the second is that trans people are
assumed not to desire the capability to biologically make children.
Both messages have strong eugenic undertones contributing to the
negative health outcomes for the trans community and the coerced
sterilization of trans people.1
For me, this experience—an incredibly common one for
transmasculine people—was also a stark reminder of how
precarious trans bodies are in our public imagination. We simply
do not exist in so many spaces. We are the men who become
pregnant, need gynecological care, want abortions; the women
who need prostate care, produce sperm, can get their partners
pregnant; the men, women, and non-binary people who may need
care that defies every expectation of how bodies look, perform, and
have sex.
The cost of not existing is felt very differently across axes of
race, immigration status, disability, poverty, and gender
presentation. For me—a white trans man; a lawyer; a person with
access to wealth and resources—it means that I may choose not to
become pregnant or that I worry about the embarrassment of
being scrutinized at the gynecologist. For my trans sisters of color,
it means devastating rates of murder, forced sterilization,
incarceration.2 For all of us, we are told that our bodies are not
meant to reproduce and that we cannot and should not parent the
kids we make and the kids we raise. These messages are the result,
in part, of legal systems that compel narratives of identity and
embodiment that fail to account for the complexity and beauty of
people’s bodies and capabilities.
It is easy to attempt to explain the tenuousness of trans bodies
in our medical and legal discourse by focusing on the way and
extent to which reproductive rights advocacy fails to account for
reproductive trans bodies. It is true that a reproductive rights and
health discourse that presumes that only women can become
1 See NAT’L LATINA INST. FOR REPROD. HEALTH, AT THE MARGINS OF CARE: THE
NEED FOR INCLUSIVE HEALTH CARE FOR TRANSGENDER & GENDER NON-CONFORMING
LATINAS 1 (2013), http://latinainstitute.org/sites/default/files/NLIRH-FactSheet-
GenderedCare-EngR3new.pdf [https://perma.cc/7A5H-HZKD].
2 Zach Stafford, Transgender Homicide Rate Hits Historic High in US, Says New Report,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/nov/13/
transgender-homicide-victims-us-has-hit-historic-high [https://perma.cc/WB7P-
6LBL] (“The Human Rights Campaign report documented 21 transgender homicide
victims so far in 2015, almost all of them transgender women of color . . . .”).
2016] CAN REPRODUCTIVE TRANS BODIES EXIST? 225
pregnant or that all women share certain reproductive capacities is
trans exclusionary at best, and anti-trans at worst. However, the
negative outcomes for trans people that flow from the current state
of reproductive rights advocacy are not unique to that context.3 In
fact, the very same consequences flow from the advocacy strategies
pursued by the transgender rights movement.
As advocates for trans people, we have similarly failed to name
and protect reproductive trans bodies. Over the course of the past
several years, as the transgender “movement” has gained visibility
in connection to and independently from a broader gay and
lesbian movement, narratives of transgender experience have
proliferated. These narratives have employed different devices to
make politically coherent the experiences of trans and gender non-
conforming people.  Often we hear stories of people “born in the
wrong body” or “never quite fitting in” until medical intervention
brought their internal senses of self into congruence with their
bodies.4  Individual trans people and advocacy movements have
utilized those narratives but have, at the same time, critiqued the
ways transgender identity and experience have been medicalized5
and how the processes for accessing health care force us as trans
patients and advocates to reproduce the very pathologizing
3 Cheryl Chastine, Cisgender Women Aren’t the Only People Who Seek Abortions, and
Activists’ Language Should Reflect That, RH REALITY CHECK (Mar. 18, 2015, 12:09 PM),
http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2015/03/18/cisgender-women-arent-people-seek-
abortions-activists-language-reflect/ [https://perma.cc/V3E8-WXF6].
4 See, e.g., Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 205 (D.D.C. 2006) (“At birth,
plaintiff was classified as male and christened ‘David John Schroer.’ From a young
age, she was socialized to wear traditionally masculine attire and to think of herself as
a boy. However, this designation did not match her gender identity . . . .”) (internal
citations omitted); see also Petition at 3, O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r of Internal
Revenue, 134 T.C. 34 (T.C. 2010) (No. 6402-06), https://www.glad.org/uploads/
docs/cases/in-re-rhiannon-odonnabhain/odonnabhain-tax-court-petition.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K9R4-AVYY] (“Since childhood, Ms. O’Donnabhain had
experienced extreme discomfort with her anatomical sex and felt a deep sense of
inappropriateness in the gender role of that sex. She had feelings that something was
not right in her body from as early as six or seven years old, but wasn’t able to put a
label on the feelings.”); JAY PROSSER, SECOND SKINS: THE BODY NARRATIVES OF
TRANSSEXUALITY 68 (Columbia Univ. Press 1998) (“Transsexual subjects frequently
articulate their bodily alienation as a discomfort with their skin or bodily encasing:
being trapped in the wrong body is figured as being in the wrong, or an extra, or a
second skin, and transsexuality is expressed as the desire to shed or step out of this
skin.”).
5 In this context, medicalization refers to the process by which narratives of
selfhood are given meaning and coherence through psychiatric and medical
discourses with their concurrent pathologizing impulse. We become defined through
our illness and cured through medical intervention. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT,
HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOLUME 1: AN INTRODUCTION (1978).
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discourses of trans experience that we critique.6
While embodiment is a central part of trans experience and
the desire for re-embodiment or changed embodiment is
important for the self-actualization of many trans-identified
people, as advocates for transgender people we have failed to
account for and embrace the many ways we inhabit our bodies.7
Even as we critique the medical model and its pathologizing
impulse, when we seek surgeries to modify our bodies and tell
stories of gendered actualization we necessarily rely on some idea
of sexed embodiment as being natural or “right” in an internal
sense. For example, when I tell my therapist that I want a
mastectomy because it fits my gender, I am reifying maleness. My
identity takes on meaning through a digression from expected
female sexed embodiment, and masculinity conflates with male
chest reconstruction. Even as I denounce the narrative I am forced
to tell of always having felt like “a boy,”8 there is something about
the maleness of a flat chest that I seek—something not only about
its flatness, but also about its maleness. As this narrative is
collectivized through our desire for the recognition of the
legitimacy of our transness as something real and politically
cognizable and our “need” for affirming care as something
legitimate, we reinforce ideas about how sexed bodies look and
operate within a binary.
By examining both reproductive and trans rights discourse,
this article poses the question of whether reproductive trans bodies
can exist in the law. The purpose is not to answer the question one
way or the other but rather to expose how all our movements are
susceptible to critique and ultimately, our advocacy strategies will
never wholly capture the multitude of people’s experiences. Rather
than focus on the ways in which our legal and political strategies
fall short, I propose an emphasis on collaborative engagement.
The goal at this stage is not necessarily to change the legal
6 See Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine, Re/Modeling Gender, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN’S
L.J. 15, 23-24 (2003) (“The medical model, ultimately, was what I had to contend with
in order to achieve the embodiment I was seeking. I learned quickly that to achieve
that embodiment, I needed to perform a desire for gender normativity, to convince
the doctors that I suffered from GID and wanted to ‘be’ a ‘man’ in a narrow sense of
both words.”).
7 Id.; see also PROSSER, supra note 4, at 33 (responding to Judith Butler, Prosser
explains, “In its representation of sex as a figurative effect of straight gender’s
constative performance, Gender Trouble cannot account for a transsexual desire for
sexed embodiment as telos.”).
8 See Spade, supra note 6, at 23-24 (discussing his own experience deploying this
narrative).
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paradigm, but rather to speak publicly and boldly about all bodies
and to honor sexed embodiment outside of the gender binary.
Once we name and embrace who we are beyond the legal and
political narratives we may be forced to tell, we might shift the
conditions for trans people and in time shift our advocacy
narratives.
I. WHAT TO MAKE OF THAT UTERUS? – REPRODUCTIVE TRANS
BODIES IN REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND TRANS RIGHTS
DISCOURSE
For my gynecologist, the existence of my uterus was presumed
to be my problem. If I wanted to be a man, in her mind, then
certainly I wouldn’t want to keep that organ that signified woman-
hood. She assumed that I desired a coherently sexed body. Under-
neath that assumption is a strand of political discourse that seeks to
expel from the categories of “womanhood” and “manhood” those
bodies that possess reproductive capacities different from those tra-
ditionally associated with the “opposite gender.” The anxiety is that
if we accept that a body without breasts and with a uterus, for ex-
ample, could desire to carry a child, we might destabilize the advo-
cacy projects of both the reproductive rights and the transgender
rights movements. This section explores how both reproductive
rights and trans rights advocacy are wary of fully embracing trans-
gender bodies.
A. Transgender People and Sex
Despite the difficulty of developing meaningful definitions to
capture the range of transgender experiences, it is still useful and
important to identify some general contours for these categories
and terms to ground a discussion of trans experience. For the past
number of years at least, the commonly used definition of the term
“transgender” has been something to the effect of “an umbrella
term referring to individuals with a gender identity or expression
that differs from the gender identity or expression associated with
the person’s assigned sex at birth.”9 Concerned that this definition
creates a problematic and completely artificial distinction between
“gender identity” and “sex,” I prefer to understand “transgender”
as a term referring to individuals with a gender that differs from
the gender assigned to them at birth, including individuals with a
9 See, e.g., GLAAD Media Reference Guide – Transgender Issues: Transgender Specific
Terminology, GLAAD, http://www.glaad.org/reference/transgender [https://
perma.cc/Z78G-U7CS].
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gender other than male or female.10 Though a transgender person
may also be “gender non-conforming,” the two terms are not coex-
tensive for every person. I use the term “gender non-conforming”
to encompass a broader range of persons who express their gender
in a manner that is not traditionally associated with their assigned
gender, whether or not they identify as transgender.
When discussing health care for transgender people, both ad-
vocates and medical providers rely on the terms gender identity,
gender, and sex. Gender identity often refers to one’s subjective
sense of belonging to a particular gender (usually assumed to be
male or female).11  The most common way of distinguishing gen-
der from sex in medical and legal discourse has been to define
gender as a culturally and socially constructed set of behaviors asso-
ciated with sex, whereas sex is “assigned at birth based upon sexual
characteristics of the external genitalia.”12 However, once interro-
gated, this distinction becomes tenuous and the idea of sexual dif-
ference is exposed as a construct itself in which binary sexual
difference is produced through our discourses of gender.13 For ex-
ample, while we may locate bodily differences among different
people, those differences are ascribed meaning through social pro-
cess. Properly understood, what we had thought of in the past as
biological sex in the sense of a noun, might be better understood
as a verb—one is sexed through a process of attaching significance
to different body parts.
B. Trans Bodies in Reproductive Rights
The movements to expand access to abortion and reproduc-
10 See, e.g., Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 731, 751 (2008)
(“[Administrative policies concerning gender changes] emerged from a growing
awareness of the existence of a group of people, currently called ‘transgender’ peo-
ple, who live their lives identifying as and expressing a different gender than the one
assigned to them at birth.”).
11 Id.
12 Robert Garofalo et al., Overlooked, Misunderstood and At-Risk: Exploring the Lives
and HIV Risk of Ethnic Minority Male-to-Female Transgender Youth, 38 J. ADOLESCENT
HEALTH 230, 230 (2006).
13 See P.-L. Chau & Jonathan Herring, Defining, Assigning and Designing Sex, 16 INT’L
J. L. POL’Y & FAM. 327, 328 (2002) (“‘[T]he hierarchical division of humanity into two
transforms an anatomical difference (which is itself devoid of social implications) into
a relevant distinction for social practice.’ In other words the ‘biological fact’ of sex is
only a ‘fact’ of any interest because of the cultural importance attached to it.”); see
generally JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY
12 (1990) (“[T]here is no recourse to a body that has not always already been inter-
preted by cultural meanings; hence, sex could not qualify as a prediscursive anatomi-
cal facticity. Indeed, sex, by definition, will be shown to have been gender all along.”).
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tive health have long and complicated histories in the law. The pur-
pose of this section is not to explore the various doctrinal strategies
for challenging restrictions on health access and discrimination
against those who are or may become pregnant. Rather it is to
highlight some of the background legal realities that have com-
pelled an emphasis on equality principles within the reproductive
rights landscape and to situate the trans rights critique within that
larger framework.
In a 2015 piece for The Nation, Katha Pollitt urged the repro-
ductive rights movement to resist a push from, according to Pollitt,
trans advocates to abandon a focus on “women” in favor of gender-
neutral terminology.14 “Who has abortions?” Pollitt began. “For
most of human history, the answer was obvious: women have abor-
tions. Girls have abortions. Not any more. People have abortions.
Patients have abortions. Men have abortions.”15 The piece went on
to position the demands of “young people” in opposition to the
needs of “half of humanity and 99.999 percent of those who get
pregnant.”16  The question, for Pollitt and many others, is how can
something as tenuous as reproductive health care for (non-trans-
gender) women abandon its core constituency. In another piece,
Pollitt wrote: “It has taken humanity thousands of years to acknowl-
edge womanhood as something to identify with proudly, to see wo-
men as bearers of rights. I wouldn’t be so quick to throw that
away.”17
The idea that somehow the needs of the transgender commu-
nity result in the “throwing away” of womanhood has come to
frame the question of how trans bodies interact with reproductive
rights advocacy. In a more hostile piece for The New York Times,
journalist Elinor Burkett, wrote incredulously of the idea that “self-
described transgender persons” would claim that “[a]bortion
rights and reproductive justice is not a women’s issue . . . .”18 In her
formulation, transgender advocates think about abortion not as a
“women’s issue” but as a “uterus owner’s issue.” This is, of course,
factually true but Burkett’s description of the advocacy by trans
14 Katha Pollitt, Who Has Abortions?, NATION (Mar. 13, 2015), http://
www.thenation.com/article/who-has-abortions/ [https://perma.cc/UJ75-THK6].
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Katha Pollitt et al., Does Talking About ‘Women’ Exclude Transgender People from the
Fight for Abortion Rights?, NATION (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.thenation.com/article/
letters-505/ [https://perma.cc/6YTJ-DHZU].
18 Elinor Burkett, What Makes a Woman?, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/opinion/sunday/what-makes-a-woman.html.
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people is quite reductive, and according to Burkett, it is this re-
framing that “undermin[es] women’s identities, and silenc[es],
eras[es] or renam[es women’s] experiences . . . .”19 For Burkett,
what is clear is that the existence of trans people has the potential
to “erase” non-transgender people—non-transgender (or cis-
gender) women, in particular.20 Trans people don’t even have to
claim space within reproductive rights or women’s rights advocacy
to threaten it with their very existence.
Both Pollitt and Burkett craft (or invent) narratives of trans
identity and advocacy that are aimed at or would have the effect of
undermining the interests of cisgender women, but neither ac-
counts for the actual experiences or goals of transgender people.
The reality is that “womanhood” as a lived reality and a political
concept should not be subject to a scarcity notion—there is
enough womanhood to go around, and one person’s experience of
and claim to womanhood does nothing to undermine or take away
another woman’s experience of the same. The idea that a trans-
woman’s claim to womanhood harms or erases non-transgender
women is just as logically incoherent as the claim that marriages
between same-sex couples would undermine the completely unre-
lated marriages of different-sex couples.21 It is not a zero sum
game. And while it is tempting to devote an entire article to the
distortions and inaccuracies that Burkett and Pollitt put forth, I do
not think engaging on this terrain is useful. Further, as offensive as
their framing is for trans people (myself included), the concerns
both authors cite about undermining the already precarious access
to reproductive health care are real and important. Though there
may be some ill-intentioned people at the margins,22 for most re-
productive rights and women’s rights activists, the resistance to a
trans-inclusive reproductive rights discourse is grounded in a fear
of losing access to reproductive health care for everyone and not in
a goal of singling out transgender people for exclusion.
The idea of shifting from talking about “pregnant women” to
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Brief for Texas Eagle Forum & Steven F. Hotze, M.D., as Amici Curiae Support-
ing Respondents, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-556).
22 There are varying degrees of insidious rhetoric when it comes to excluding
transgender people from women’s and reproductive rights discourse and advocacy.
On the extreme end are trans exclusionary radical feminists (TERFs) like Cathy Bren-
nan and Janice Raymond who do not believe that transgender people exist at all and
make public efforts to denounce transgender people, using the wrong names and
pronouns and opposing access to health care for transgender people. See, e.g., JANICE
RAYMOND, THE TRANSSEXUAL EMPIRE (Beacon Press 1979).
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“pregnant people” can evoke traumatic memories of the Supreme
Court’s refusal to protect pregnant people from discrimination
under a sex discrimination theory forty years ago. In Geduldig v.
Aiello, the Supreme Court considered whether discrimination on
the basis of pregnancy constituted sex discrimination for purposes
of equal protection.23 The case involved a challenge to California’s
disability insurance program that excluded from coverage work
loss related to pregnancy.24 The Court rejected the argument that
pregnancy discrimination constituted sex discrimination, reason-
ing in a now infamous footnote:
The California insurance program does not exclude anyone
from benefit eligibility because of gender but merely removes
one physical condition—pregnancy—from the list of compensa-
ble disabilities. While it is true that only women can become
pregnant it does not follow that every legislative classification
concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification like those
considered in [Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), and Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)]. Normal pregnancy is an objec-
tively identifiable physical condition with unique characteristics.
Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere
pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against
the members of one sex or the other, lawmakers are constitu-
tionally free to include or exclude pregnancy from the coverage
of legislation such as this on any reasonable basis, just as with
respect to any other physical condition. The lack of identity be-
tween the excluded disability and gender as such under this in-
surance program becomes clear upon the most cursory analysis.
The program divides potential recipients into two groups—
pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. While the first
group is exclusively female, the second includes members of
both sexes.25
Though the decision was essentially overruled by Congress when it
passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act in 1978, the legal holding
that pregnancy discrimination is not sex discrimination still
stands.26 Relying on Geduldig, the Court has since held that restric-
tions on abortion access likewise do not constitute sex
discrimination.27
23 Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494 (1974).
24 Id. at 492.
25 Id. at 496 n.20.
26 Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. E.E.O.C., 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
27 See, e.g., Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 271 (1993)
(“Respondents’ case comes down, then, to the proposition . . . that since voluntary
abortion is an activity engaged in only by women, to disfavor it is ispso facto to discrimi-
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The Court’s refusal to recognize discrimination based on
pregnancy and restrictions on access to abortion as sex discrimina-
tion is particularly concerning for those who may become pregnant
because the substantive due process line of cases have failed to ade-
quately protect the rights of those who are or may become preg-
nant. In the immediate aftermath of the Court’s decision in Roe v.
Wade, Congress and the states acted swiftly to restrict abortion ac-
cess.28  Restrictions continued, and in 1992, the Court was again
confronted with the question of whether and to what extent the
decision to terminate a pregnancy was protected by the Constitu-
tion. That year, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, the Court reaffirmed the central holding of Roe that the deci-
sion to end a pregnancy before the viability of a fetus is protected
by due process and that any restriction amounting to an undue
burden on this liberty interest is unconstitutional.29 But abortion
restrictions continued to proliferate and the legal test set up in
Casey and its progeny has been ineffective at halting—and has ac-
tively contributed to—the continued assault on the availability of
safe and legal abortions. This term, the Court will again consider
the contours of the “undue burden” test in Whole Woman’s Health v.
Hellerstedt, a case challenging Texas laws that would, according to
petitioners, “cause a significant reduction in the availability of
abortion services while failing to advance the State’s interest in pro-
moting health.”30 If the Court upholds the targeted regulation of
abortion providers (“TRAP”) laws in Texas, the impact will be felt
most severely by low-income people across the country whose ac-
cess to safe and legal abortion will all but disappear.31
nate invidiously against women as a class. Our cases do not support that
proposition.”).
28 Before the close of 1973, Congress passed a law that exempted any individual or
entity receiving federal funds from any requirement to perform an abortion where
such performance would be contrary to the individual’s or the institution’s religious
beliefs. Public Health Service Act, Pub. L. No. 93-45, § 401, 87 Stat. 91, 95-96 (1973)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (2012)). More restrictions followed, such
that now at least forty-four states permit health care institutions to refuse to provide
abortion services, and forty-four states permit individual health care providers to re-
fuse. GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF AS OF OCTOBER 1, 2014: REFUSING TO
PROVIDE HEALTH SERVICES (2014), https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/
pdfs/spibs/spib_RPHS.pdf [http://perma.cc/66QB-FAVN].
29 Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876-77 (1992).
30 Brief for Petitioners, Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, No. 15-274 (S. Ct. petition
for cert. filed Sept. 2, 2015), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/
01/15-274-ts-reprint.pdf [https://perma.cc/XX5B-D23Q].
31 See, e.g., Miriam Zoila Pe´rez, Everything You Need to Know About the Biggest Abortion
Case In Our Lifetime, COLOR LINES (Jan. 22, 2016), http://www.colorlines.com/arti-
cles/everything-you-need-know-about-biggest-abortion-case-our-lifetime [https://
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The decision to center cisgender women in the conversations
about pregnancy and abortion access has been compelled by the
Court’s holdings in Geduldig, Roe, and Casey in which the Court has
gone out of its way to obscure the concrete and measurable harms
to those forced to carry an unwanted or unsafe pregnancy to term.
The shift to an equality discourse that foregrounds the experiences
of women in reproductive rights and health advocacy is a logical
one. The alternative would have been to risk ceding the conversa-
tion to the abstract principles of liberty and the balancing of bur-
dens, which have completely failed to protect all people who may
become pregnant from restrictive and dangerous laws restricting
abortion access. As Justice Ginsburg notes in her dissent in Gonzales
v. Carhart, “legal challenges to undue restrictions on abortion pro-
cedures do not seek to vindicate some generalized notion of pri-
vacy; rather, they center on a woman’s autonomy to determine her
life’s course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature.”32
Given this history, it is understandable why the women’s rights
movement would be wary of decentering “women” from such cam-
paigns as “Stand With Women” or “Stop the War on Women” be-
cause the framing does not include the experiences of trans
people. There is an urgent need to halt the harms flowing to cis-
gender women from abortion restrictions and pregnancy discrimi-
nation,33 and it is strategic and important for the reproductive
rights and women’s rights movements to highlight the harms of
these restrictions on their constituencies. That is why Pollitt writes,
“Once you start talking about ‘people,’ not ‘women,’ you lose what
abortion means historically, symbolically and socially. It becomes
hard to understand why it isn’t simply about the right to life of the
‘unborn.’”34 It does make sense within the political landscape and
perma.cc/DAR6-UGNB]; Brief for Planned Parenthood Federation of America et al.
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Whole Women’s Health v. Cole, No. 15-274,
(S. Ct. Jan. 4, 2016), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/
Planned-Parenthood-Federation-of-America.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8TN-G97Y].
32 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 172 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
33 Each year brings new proposals to restrict abortion access in the states, with the
cost born disproportionately by people living in rural places, people living in poverty,
and people of color. See, e.g., CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, 2015 STATE OF THE STATES:
FIGHTING BACK BY PUSHING FORWARD, http://www.reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.
civicactions.net/files/documents/USPS-Year-End-Report-Vs-6.pdf [https://
perma.cc/MWY8-Q8M4] (discussing the 400 bills and forty-seven newly enacted re-
strictions on access to reproductive health care in 2015); see also Crisis in the South,
CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, http://www.reproductiverights.org/feature/crisis-in-the-
south [https://perma.cc/YZ45-V325] (discussing the impact of abortion restrictions
on women who are marginalized).
34 Pollitt, supra note 14.
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given the constraints under which we are operating that we talk
about “women” when we talk about pregnancy and abortion. The
problem and the challenge is that an emphasis on cisgender wo-
men and the experiences of cisgender women can quickly and un-
critically translate into a set of narratives that fail to account for the
existence of transgender people at all.
This erasure of reproductive trans bodies has shown up uncrit-
ically in much of the legal scholarship engaging with questions of
reproductive autonomy, pregnancy discrimination, and reproduc-
tive health.35 The standard post-Geduldig formulary becomes:
“Given the indisputable facts that only women become pregnant,
that generally only women who have recently been pregnant and
given birth lactate, that only women who are lactating are able to
breastfeed, and that only women who are breastfeeding need to
pump or manually express milk from their breasts, the chain of
causation from sex to pregnancy to lactation to breastfeeding to
expressing milk would appear to be fairly clear.”36 Even in a sympo-
sium entitled “Pregnant Man?”37 scholars essentially disavowed
trans existence. The language in the scholarship seemed to gratui-
tously exclude the trans experience: “simply because biology pre-
vents a man from being pregnant (Thomas Beatie apart);”38
“Breast-feeding is a function only women can perform;”39 “It also is
interesting that pregnancy, that one thing that only women (de-
fined biologically) can do, is the source of such angst.”40
Scholarship also erases the existence of women who are trans-
gender and unable to become pregnant by conflating the defini-
tion of womanhood with an ability to be or become pregnant. As
one author wrote of Geduldig:
It contains an obvious fallacy. While it is true that not all women
are pregnant at any one time, all women, as a class, are suscepti-
ble to pregnancy (and bear in the United States an average of
two children apiece). But even if pregnancy were a risk for only
a small subclass of women, the sex discrimination issue would
35 See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955,
983 (1984) (“Criticizing Geduldig has since become a cottage industry. Over two dozen
law review articles have condemned both the Court’s approach and the result.”).
36 L. Camille He´bert, The Causal Relationship of Sex, Pregnancy, Lactation, and
Breastfeeding and the Meaning of “Because of . . . Sex” Under Title VII, 12 GEO. J. GENDER &
L. 119, 119 (2011).
37 Darren Rosenblum et al., Pregnant Man?: A Conversation, 22 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
207, 277 (2010).
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 232.
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still be a live one.41
None of these formulations are true, and more insidiously, all of
these formulations make it more difficult for transgender people
to stake our own claims to bodily autonomy and reproductive
health. What becomes of the transgender woman who cannot be-
come pregnant or the transgender man who is pregnant? They are
quite literally written out of existence.
The legal history of pregnancy and abortion restrictions is
helpful for understanding why and how trans people are margin-
ally situated in reproductive rights advocacy and discourse. The law
constrains the narrative that advocates can deploy to resist and
destabilize the harms set up through legal restrictions and discrimi-
nation. By neutralizing possible discrimination arguments in Roe,
Geduldig, and Casey, the Court framed the terms of the debate over
reproductive health access in abstract principles rather than real
world consequences. The reality for trans people in reproductive
rights discourse is that our bodies complicate the coherence of a
narrative that is already fragile because of the fraught and unset-
tled nature of the legal protection at stake. This is true of all legal
work, and some bodies and some people are always excluded or
made more vulnerable. So what do we do? The answer is not sim-
ple, but we might better understand the problem if we look at how
the trans advocacy movement has similarly contributed to the era-
sure of reproductive trans bodies.
C. Reproductive Trans Bodies in Trans Rights Advocacy
In some of the same ways that reproductive rights advocacy
has refused to account for and accommodate the realities of trans
bodies, so too have advocates for transgender rights. If the trans
movement is to critique the ways in which we have been excluded
from reproductive rights discourse, we must do so with a full recog-
nition of our own complicity in the same exclusionary practices.
Just as reproductive rights advocates have been forced to make cer-
tain linguistic and strategic choices in advocacy because of the re-
strictions in place, trans advocates have made similar choices with
attendant costs and benefits in response to legal restrictions and
social pressures. This section explores the ways in which trans advo-
cacy challenges to restrictions on insurance coverage for trans-
gender health care and access to accurate identification for
41 Diane L. Zimmerman, Geduldig v. Aiello: Pregnancy Classifications and the Defini-
tion of Sex Discrimination, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 441, 448 (1975) (emphasis omitted).
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transgender people have contributed to the erasure of reproduc-
tive trans bodies.
Though the past few years have witnessed tremendous ad-
vances for transgender people, restrictions on health and identifi-
cation access continue to threaten the health and well being of the
trans community. Despite a medical consensus that “gender-af-
firming” health care—like hormone therapy and surgery—is medi-
cally necessary and safe, many public and private insurance
programs exclude such care from coverage.42 While that care is ex-
cluded, many government record-keeping bodies continue to re-
quire proof of surgical transition in order to update the record of a
person’s gender.43 What this means is that a transgender woman in
Alabama, for example, may have a medical need for genital sur-
gery, but unless she can pay the $50,000 to cover the cost of the
care out of pocket, she will not be able to receive the care.44 At the
same time, in order to update the gender listed on her Alabama
driver’s license to reflect her female gender, she will have to prove
that she has had the surgical procedure that she cannot have be-
cause of the exclusions in place.45 This person will then have poor
health outcomes because she is wrongly identified as male on her
identification and unable to obtain needed care to treat her medi-
cal condition. She will also be vulnerable to violence because every
time she uses her driver’s license she will be outed as transgender
in a climate where transgender people—particularly transgender
women—face harassment and physical abuse for simply existing.46
Given the consequences for trans people that flow from insur-
ance coverage restrictions and onerous policies for updating iden-
42 See Pooja S. Gehi & Gabriel Arkles, Unraveling Injustice: Race and Class Impact of
Medicaid Exclusions of Transition-Related Health Care for Transgender People, 4 SEXUALITY
RES. & SOC. POL’Y 7, 7 (2007).
43 See generally ID Documents Center, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., http://
www.transequality.org/documents [https://perma.cc/ZV8T-ZRZJ] (compiling poli-
cies in various jurisdictions).
44 JODY L. HERMAN, THE WILLIAMS INSTITUTE, COSTS AND BENEFITS OF PROVIDING
TRANSITION-RELATED HEALTH CARE COVERAGE IN EMPLOYEE HEALTH BENEFITS PLANS 5
(2013), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Herman-Cost-
Benefit-of-Trans-Health-Benefits-Sept-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/7K9N-PX4X] (esti-
mating cost per claimant for trans health care at around $50,000).
45 See ID Documents Center: Alabama, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., http://
www.transequality.org/documents/state/Alabama [https://perma.cc/S6RH-7HRV]
(“[D]ocumentation signed by a surgeon verifying that the applicant has completed
gender reassignment surgery [is required].”).
46 See generally JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 2 (2011) (finding pervasive discrimi-
nation in areas including education, economic security, housing, treatment by police,
and health care).
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tification documents, it is no surprise that the trans movement has
focused on increasing access to both health care coverage and
identification documents. The problem is that when we advocate
with the insurance industry and the government to broaden access
to gender-affirming surgeries we often become trapped in a “medi-
cal necessity” discourse that reinforces binary sexual difference. We
also bump up against our strategies for removing surgical stan-
dards for updating identification documents to accurately reflect
our genders with government record keepers. While in the former
context we argue that gender-affirming health care is necessary to
make our bodies coherent, in the latter we contend that internal
self-identification as male or female regardless of medical interven-
tion is “sufficient” to make our gender identities “real.” These two
strategies reflect the ambivalent and confused relationship that
trans advocacy has with the body, and the tension between them
can have the effect of placing trans bodies (and all bodies) in pre-
carious and impossible positions.
One example of the hazards of strategies for removing trans
exclusions from health insurance coverage can be found in the suc-
cessful challenges to the New York State Medicaid program’s exclu-
sions on coverage for gender-affirming health care. In the first case
challenging this exclusion, Casillas v. Daines, the plaintiff argued
that to deny her access to sex reassignment procedures contra-
vened state Medicaid law requiring coverage for “medically neces-
sary procedures.”47 To make out this claim, the plaintiff had to
establish, among other things, that she had a medical diagnosis of
gender identity disorder (“GID”),48 what is now known as gender
dysphoria, for which surgical intervention was medically necessary.
The complaint explains how this necessity for female sexed embod-
iment came about: first, “Ms. C was a biological male at birth, but
has identified as a woman since 1974;” then, she was diagnosed
with GID and she began to live “as a woman” including bringing
her physical body into conformity with her internal sense of her
womanness; ultimately, Ms. C “needs gender reassignment surgery
in order to achieve the capacity to live a life without terrible suffer-
47 Complaint ¶ 39, Casillas v. Daines, 580 F. Supp. 2d 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 07
Civ. 04082).
48 Gender Identity Disorder is a condition defined by the American Psychiatric
Association as “a condition characterized by a strong and persistent cross gender iden-
tification and discomfort about one’s assigned sex, unrelated to either a perceived
cultural advantage of being the other sex or a concurrent physical intersex condition,
which results in clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupation or
important areas of functioning.” AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 576 (4th ed. 1994).
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ing.”49 Though advocates were careful not to fully flesh out the
more problematic narrative (“I am a woman inside, therefore I
need this surgery to become a woman on the outside”), that sub-
text is clear in the story the plaintiff is compelled to tell. When
seeking recognition from the insurance excluder—whether that be
the government or a private company—the medical necessity stan-
dard constrains us to a narrative about sexed embodiment wherein
to be a woman, one must attain womanly embodiment with all of
its attending physicality and meaning.50
Our trans advocacy strategies reproduce norms of sexed em-
bodiment that make it harder to embrace and celebrate the range
of bodies our communities inhabit. For example, in O’Donnabhain
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, a transgender woman sued the
Internal Revenue Service for excluding from her deductions medi-
cal expenses related to her gender transition.51 Under IRS rules, a
medical expense can be deducted from one’s taxable income so
long as it is not “experimental” or “cosmetic.” The IRS had deter-
mined that Ms. O’Donnabhain’s expenses related to her gender
transition were cosmetic and therefore not deductible, and she
sued in Tax Court.52 To establish her medical need for the proce-
dures for which she sought deductions, Ms. O’Donnabhain’s com-
plaint, like Ms. Casillas’, explains how she “grew up with a medical
condition in which her self-identification as female did not align
with her male anatomical sex.”53 Her surgeries, the complaint ex-
plains, were directed to “cure” her GID (a “disease” within the
49 Complaint, Casillas v. Daines, supra note 47, ¶ 56 (emphasis added).
50 This narrative can be found in almost every case challenging exclusions on
health care coverage for transgender people. See, e.g., Amended Complaint ¶ 38, Nor-
sworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1104 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 3:14-cv-00695-JST), http:/
/transgenderlawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/First-Amended-Com
plaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6U7-9WMD] (“Plaintiff is a ‘biological female’ based
upon her hormone levels and chemical castration, yet is being forced to live every
minute of every day in a body with male genitalia that does not match her biology or
deeply rooted identity.”); Amended Complaint ¶ 108, Manning v. Carter, No. 1:14-cv-
1609-CKK (D.D.C. May 5, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/
field_document/041_amended_complaint_2015.10.05.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9YG-
QV8Q] (“She is forced to cut her hair in a masculine manner undermining her ability
to be affirmed in her female gender.”); Verified Complaint ¶ 5, Diamond v. Owens,
No. 5:15-cv-00050 (MTT), 2015 WL 5341015 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 19, 2015), https://
www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/d6_legacy_files/downloads/case/com-
plaint_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/944T-JCJA] (“As a result of her continued denial of
care, Ms. Diamond’s body has been violently transformed, she has been forced to
transition back from a man to a woman, and she has experienced physical symptoms
of withdrawal.”).
51 O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 134 T.C. 34 (2010).
52 See Petition, O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, supra note 4.
53 Id. at 3.
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meaning of the Tax Code)—whereby her body could align with
her self-identified female gender.54 The narrative sets up a binary
of male and female, which is anatomically defined, and presumed
to pre-exist its articulation.55 To be the “woman” that she feels she
is, Ms. O’Donnabhain’s body must be transformed. Our citation of
this norm produces and re-produces womanhood: the story is not
simply descriptive of what the complainant feels but also produc-
tive of what a woman is. But what happens to the woman who has a
penis or has no breasts—can she be a woman within this frame-
work? Can her medical care be justified? Does this not leave out
the members of the trans community whose body and identity is
not as coherently sexed within that framework?
Not only do we produce binary sexed embodiment through
our advocacy discourse, but we also then afford the Court the op-
portunity to codify sexed norms of how bodies look and operate. In
O’Donnabhain, the Court ultimately concludes that because Ms.
O’Donnabhain has gender identity disorder, most of her gender
reassignment procedures were medically necessary within the
meaning of the Tax Code and therefore are deductible. But the
Court excepts from that determination Ms. O’Donnabhain’s breast
augmentation, which it determines was cosmetic.56 Because her
surgeon noted that an “examination of [Ms. O’Donnabhain’s]
breasts reveal [sic] approximately B cup breasts with a very nice
shape,”57 the Court concludes “[the breast augmentation] surgery
was not necessary to the treatment of GID in petitioner’s case be-
cause petitioner already had normal breasts before her surgery.”58 It
should be terrifying to think of our genders being subjected to ju-
dicial fact-finding whereby our medical and survival needs might
turn on whether a fact finder believes our breasts or other sexed
body parts are “normal.” When we pursue relief through the law,
we necessarily participate in a process whereby bodies are sexed in
accordance with a norm. Not only do we participate in the produc-
tion of that norm, but we create opportunities for the state to fur-
54 Id. at 7.
55 See BUTLER, supra note 13, at 33 (challenging our understanding of sex as the
natural state upon which the cultural/constructed gender norms were inscribed)
(“No longer believable as an interior ‘truth’ of dispositions and identity, sex will be
shown to be a performatively enacted signification (and hence not ‘to be’), one that,
released from its naturalized interiority and surface, can occasion the parodic
proliferation and subversive play of gendered meanings.”).
56 O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. 34 at 73.
57 Id. at 72.
58 Id. (emphasis added).
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ther entrench the bounds of what constitutes “normal” sexed
embodiment.
While the trans community has voiced concern over the way in
which medicalization demeans our bodies and experiences, we
must consider our own role in creating these discourses through
the repeated citation of these narratives in our advocacy. Diagnos-
tic criteria and standards of “authentic” trans experience displace
processes of self-identification and place power in the hands of
medical providers as gatekeepers. In his reflection on seeking a
double mastectomy (or “top surgery”), Dean Spade expresses con-
cern over the power of diagnostic criteria to reify “the transsexual”
as a category: “By instructing the doctor/parent/teacher to focus
on the transgressive behavior, the diagnostic criteria for GID estab-
lishes surveillance and regulation effective for keeping both non-
transsexuals and transsexuals in adherence to their roles.”59 Citing
Bernice Hausman, Spade goes on to explain how “transsexuals
must seek and obtain medical treatment in order to be recognized
as ‘transsexuals.’ Their subject position depends upon a necessary
relation to the medical establishment and its discourses.”60 This is
true and part of the problem, but as advocates we then fail to ac-
count for how we, through the collectivization of our medicalized
identities to seek recognition from the government and access to
care, re-entrench binary norms of sexual difference. To explain
our identities in the medicalized language available to us and in
ways that the government will understand and recognize, we par-
take in a project of (re-)producing what it means to have a sexed
body.
On an ideological level this complicity in binary sexing is con-
cerning, but even more so our articulations of selfhood invoke
standards of sexed embodiment that are self-eliminating. We seek
to access insurance coverage for our “medically necessary” proce-
dures, and in so doing reinforce, for example, womanness as inex-
tricably tied to the state of not having a penis—the thing that must
be removed for a woman’s identity to be actualized. At the same
time, our community includes women with penises who are then
unable to access other—also needed—medical care such as pros-
tate exams, testicular exams, and reproductive health support. We
further take away from those women the legal recognition of their
medical need for care like breast augmentation or facial feminiza-
tion surgery. Those procedures are either viewed as cosmetic, or
59 Spade, supra note 6, at 25.
60 Id. at 19.
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the patient is viewed as undeserving of care because they, for exam-
ple, might not want or need genital surgery and, therefore, are not
“really” women within the framework we have set up.
II. WHAT DOES THIS MEAN AND WHAT CAN WE DO?
Whether in the reproductive rights or the trans rights space,
the cost to trans people of advocacy strategies that lose sight of our
bodies and bodily capabilities reinforce presumptions that all bod-
ies are coherently sexed and that trans bodies, in particular, are
not able to reproduce or desiring of reproduction. The presump-
tion that a body is coherently sexed is, in turn, literally killing trans
people through a variety of mechanisms.61
Even as exclusions on health care coverage for transition-re-
lated health care like hormone therapy and surgery are struck
down and repealed, the government and insurance industries con-
tinue to regulate medical procedures in accordance with sex. For
example, in the same regulation that had precluded coverage for
gender-affirming care under New York State’s Medicaid program,
New York continues to regulate access to hysterectomies on sexed
terms.62  Hysterectomies are not covered where the sole purpose of
the procedure is to prevent further pregnancies but are available
and reimbursable under certain conditions where “the woman was
sterile before the hysterectomy was performed.”63 The language
does not explicitly preclude coverage for a person not classified as
“a woman.” However, in practice, the coding of a recipient’s sex as
male will preclude access to coverage for procedures associated
with femaleness.64 This includes hysterectomies, gynecological ex-
ams, obstetric exams, and mammograms. Where a person with a
61 I use the term “coherently sexed” to refer to the presumption that once some-
one is identified as a particular gender (male or female) they will both have and
desire one set of body parts associated with that sex. For a man who is transgender,
this means that he is assumed to neither have nor desire any reproductive organs
associated with women.
62 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 505.2(h)(2)(ii)(a) (2015) (presuming
the person in need of a hysterectomy is “a woman”).
63 Id. (emphasis added).
64 This observation is based on my own experiences as an advocate for low-income
transgender Medicaid recipients in New York, as well as on conversations with other
advocates who have noticed similar patterns of coverage denial. See also Dorothy
Cornwell, Proposed Rule on ACA Nondiscrimination: Coverage for Transgender Individuals,
57 NO. 12 DRI FOR DEF. 49, 54 (2015) (“Many commenters responding to the HHS
request for information noted that transgender individuals are routinely denied cov-
erage for medically appropriate sex-specific health services due to their gender iden-
tity or because they are enrolled in their health plans as one sex because the health
services are generally associated with another sex.”).
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uterus and breasts has a double mastectomy and is classified as
male for purposes of Medicaid, that person may not be able to ac-
cess gynecological care under the state’s Medicaid scheme.65 Simi-
lar problems arise for people classified as female but who need
prostate care, testicular care, and other care that is limited to those
coded as male.66
This mismatch between how a person’s gender is classified
and what the insurer believes to be a gender-limited procedure has
long-term negative health consequences for people whose bodies
do not conform to a coherent model of binary sexual difference.
In addition to mismatched coding preventing needed care,
there are emotional and physical consequences for some people
for entering physician’s offices that are widely viewed as sex-spe-
cific.67 Like my own experiences described above, when a person
who is read and perceived as male but who happens to have a
uterus goes to the gynecologist, the experience can invite trau-
matic gazes from other patients and physicians. For this reason,
many people avoid or delay going to the doctor.68 As the National
Latina Institute for Reproductive Health observed:
Because reproductive health screenings are heavily gendered,
simple procedures such as pap smears and prostate exams are
difficult to obtain without fear of humiliation and discrimina-
tion. Patients cannot trust that most providers will have any ex-
pertise in health issues that affect them, and there are
documented cases of physicians refusing to treat transgender
patients with reproductive cancers.69
Failure to receive regular cervical, uterine, and ovarian exams will
ultimately increase the likelihood of people with these organs de-
veloping malignancies.
The data that exists confirms that transgender people experi-
ence extreme discrimination in health care settings causing them
to delay or avoid receiving care. The National Center for Trans-
gender Equality reports that “[o]ne in three transgender people,
and 48% of transgender men, have delayed or avoided preventive
health care such as pelvic exams or STI screening out of fear of
65 See Lisa Gillespie, Despite Obamacare Promise, Transgender People Have Trouble Get-
ting Some Care, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (July 22, 2015), http://khn.org/news/despite-
obamacare-promise-transgender-people-have-trouble-getting-some-care/ [https://
perma.cc/W2R5-YVBU] (discussing the barriers to health care faced by transgender
people due to the coding of services along the gender binary).
66 See id.
67 NAT’L LATINA INST., supra note 1.
68 Id.
69 Id.
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discrimination or disrespect.”70 Additionally, transgender young
people, including those who are at risk of unintended pregnancy,
are hesitant to go to family planning clinics, increasing the likeli-
hood of complications and poor health outcomes.71 Most trans-
gender boys and men, as high as 93.8%, who have sex with
cisgender men report a lack of adequate medical information
about their sexual health needs.72 This means that in sexual rela-
tionships that could result in pregnancy, for example, people are
not receiving the information or health care that they need. This
lack of information makes the trans community particularly vulner-
able to negative reproductive health outcomes.
In addition to the administrative incoherence and discrimina-
tion that makes health care access more difficult for transgender
people, the reiteration of norms that do not account for our varied
bodies also contributes to the climate where trans bodies are po-
liced and killed. If we establish in law and social discourse that bod-
ies must be coherently sexed to be legitimate, we make spaces for
the harassment and violence levied upon those whose bodies trans-
gress those expectations. These expectations are connected to why
we see upticks in violence, and particularly deadly violence, in the
transgender community, particularly among transgender women
of color.73 For strangers, transgender bodies can be understood to
be deceptive in nature, causing people to lash out against a trans-
gender partner. This is the narrative that, for example, Lance Cor-
poral Joseph Scott Pemberton told of killing Jennifer Laude, a
transgender woman, while he was on duty in the Philippines.74 The
two had met in a nightclub and went back to Pemberton’s hotel
room where, he recounted at trial, he discovered that she had a
penis, became enraged, and killed her.75 This same dynamic can
play out in intimate partnerships as well, where  “abuse is in large
part about controlling and enforcing gender norms within rela-
70 NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., TRANSGENDER SEXUAL AND REPRODUCTIVE
HEALTH: UNMET NEEDS AND BARRIERS TO CARE (2012), http://www.transequality.org/
sites/default/files/docs/resources/Factsheet_TransSexualandReproHealth_April
2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/8K6N-KCJN].
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Katy Steinmetz, Why Transgender People Are Being Murdered at a Historic Rate, TIME
(Aug. 17, 2015), http://time.com/3999348/transgender-murders-2015/ [https://
perma.cc/63FG-4WTL].
74 See Floyd Whaley, U.S. Marine Guilty in Killing of Transgender Woman in Philippines,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2015, at A6, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/02/world/asia/
us-marine-joseph-pemberton-guilty-in-killing-of-transgender-woman-in-philippines
.html [https://perma.cc/CJC7-TKN9].
75 Id.
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tionships [and] transgender people, by virtue of their failure to
conform to such norms, are particularly vulnerable to [such]
abuse.”76 We make space for such violence by creating legal norms
that reinforce the notion that a woman cannot have a penis or that
a body that does not cohere to our ideas of proper sexed embodi-
ment is deviant and undesirable.
What this all means, I think, is that even if the entire reproduc-
tive rights movement stopped centering cisgender women in its ad-
vocacy, I am not convinced that we would see a change in the
material conditions for transgender people. It would be symboli-
cally important and more inclusive, sure, but it would not necessa-
rily change my experience at the gynecologist, and it certainly
would not end the violence and discrimination faced by trans-
gender people of color. Instead of focusing on those changes in
language—important as they are—I propose that we start by more
robustly centering trans bodies in LGBT and trans rights work in
ways that may have a greater impact on the life chances of trans-
gender people.
This means talking about the fact that, for example, a trans-
gender person who is a woman might have and embrace both
breasts and a penis. Or that a transgender man may desire to be-
come pregnant and that such desire and the act of being pregnant
makes him no less of a man. These principles are central to our
movement, but in our advocacy for health care access or restroom
access or accurate identification we are often afraid that naming
and embracing our bodies will jeopardize our work. But in reality,
the reverse is true. We are jeopardizing our work and constraining
our successes by not engaging with our bodies. If we do not nor-
malize the way we inhabit our bodies, the ways that we have sex,
and the ways that our bodies are targeted, we will not be successful
in making space for our full communities to thrive.
III. CONCLUSION
Our work as advocates and particularly as legal advocates will
inevitably spread costs and benefits across our many constituencies
and communities. The nature of legal work, as a mentor once re-
minded me, is that you will always have blood on your hands.
When you interface with a violent and flawed system, your interven-
tions will be violent and flawed. So to advocate for trans people to
receive life saving health care will likely entrench binaries that ex-
76 Leigh Goodmark, Transgender People, Intimate Partner Abuse, and the Legal System,
48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 51, 55 (2013).
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clude health care for members of our communities. That does not
mean we do nothing, but it should caution us in our critiques and
we should look to model collaboration before centering critique
and frustration. Is the reproductive rights movement flawed? Yes. Is
our own movement equally flawed? Definitely.
The impulse to question the connection between trans and
reproductive justice is a critical one, but I worry we are focusing on
the wrong aspects of intersection. We can and must destabilize the
meaning of sex and the sexing of our bodies. To do this, we have to
recognize and engage with our bodies in all of our work. Our bod-
ies are not simply vehicles crossing from one side of a coherently
sexed gender binary to the other. We must name our existence in
its child-bearing, sperm-producing, and menstruating capacities.
The cost of not doing so is more than theoretical. Reiteration of
the presumptive norm of sexed embodiment as male and female,
and their respective bodily formations, makes our lives and bodies
as trans people impossible.  If we are to survive, we must exist.

